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Corporate Vicarious Liability for Punitive
Damages
The fathers shall not be put to death for the children, neither
shall the children be put to death for the fathers: every man
shall be put to death for his own sin.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Punitive damages "are awarded to punish the wrongdoer for
his malicious, vindictive, willful or wanton invasion of the in-
jured person's rights. They also serve as an example to restrain
and deter others from the commission of such wrongs."' 2 Courts
are split regarding when corporate vicarious liability for punitive
damages meets the goals of punishment and deterrence.'
Some courts follow a "course of employment" rule and im-
pose corporate vicarious liability for punitive damages whenever
the employee acts within the scope of his employment 4 and
would be personally liable for punitive damages.5 Other courts
follow a narrower "complicity" rule, which requires not only that
the employee act within the scope of employment but also that
the corporation authorize or ratify the act, the corporation reck-
lessly retain or employ the employee, or the act be committed by
a managerial employee.6 Eighteen jurisdictions follow the course
1. Deuteronomy 24:16 (King James).
2. Kline v. Multi-Media Cablevision, Inc., 233 Kan. 988, 989, 666 P.2d 711, 713
(1983); see also Williams v. City of New York, 508 F.2d 356, 360 (2d Cir. 1974); Parris v.
St. Johnsbury Trucking Co., 395 F.2d 543, 545 (2d Cir. 1968); Tolle v. Interstate Sys.
Truck Lines, Inc., 42 Ill. App. 3d 771, 772-73, 356 N.E.2d 625, 626 (1976); Embrey v.
Holly, 293 Md. 128, 141, 442 A.2d 966, 973 (1982) (quoting Wedeman v. City Chevrolet
Co., 278 Md. 524, 531, 366 A.2d 7, 12 (1976)); Detling v. Chockley, 70 Ohio St. 2d 134,
136, 436 N.E.2d 208, 209 (1982); Dayton Hudson Corp. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co.,
621 P.2d 1155, 1160 (Okla. 1980); Campen v. Stone, 635 P.2d 1121, 1124 (Wyo. 1981);
Town of Jackson v. Shaw, 569 P.2d 1246, 1252-53 (Wyo. 1977).
3. However, courts are unanimous in holding employers liable for compensatory
damages. See, e.g., Embrey v. Holly, 293 Md. 128, 134, 442 A.2d 966, 969 (1982) ("[T]he
master's liability for compensatory damages in the usual case is beyond question
... 99 °).
4. Defining "scope of employment" is beyond the scope of this comment.
5. Briner v. Hyslop, 337 N.W.2d 858, 861 (Iowa 1983); see also W. KEETON, D.
DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 13 (5th
ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
6. Briner v. Hyslop, 337 N.W.2d 858, 861 (Iowa 1983). The complicity rule is based
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of employment rule,7 twenty-five follow the complicity rule,8
four do not award punitive damages,9 and four have not ad-
dressed the issue.10
Neither rule correctly imposes corporate vicarious liability
for punitive damages. The complicity rule addresses corporate
involvement, an irrelevance under the doctrine of respondeat su-
perior, and the course of employment rule imposes liability when
punitive damage awards serve no societal purpose. This com-
ment analyzes the weaknesses of both rules and recommends an
approach that discards punishment concerns and limits liability
to situations involving tortious conduct likely to recur.
II. WEAKNESSES OF THE COMPLICITY RULE
Complicity proponents contend that the purpose for award-
ing punitive damages is best served by limiting liability to situa-
tions involving corporate participation. The requisite corporate
on RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 (1979):
Punitive damages can properly be awarded against a master or other principal
because of an act by an agent if, but only if,
(a) the principal or a managerial agent authorized the doing and the man-
ner of the act, or
(b) the agent was unfit and the principal or a managerial agent was reck-
less in employing or retaining him, or
(c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in the
scope of employment, or
(d) the principal or a managerial agent of the principal ratified or ap-
proved the act.
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217C (1958).
7. Briner v. Hyslop, 337 N.W.2d 858, 864 (Iowa 1983), lists the following eighteen
jurisdictions as having adopted the course of employment rule: Alabama, Arizona, Ar-
kansas, Delaware, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and
Tennessee.
Briner also suggests that Kansas and Oregon have adopted the course of employ-
ment rule. However, Kansas recently adopted the complicity rule in Kline v. Multi-Me-
dia Cablevision, Inc., 233 Kan. 988, 666 P.2d 711 (1983), and Oregon adopted a modified
complicity rule in Stroud v. Denny's Restaurant, Inc., 271 Or. 430, 532 P.2d 790 (1975)
(ignoring the managerial employee requirement).
8. Briner v. Hyslop, 337 N.W.2d 858, 864-67 (Iowa 1983), lists the following twenty-
three jurisdictions as having adopted the complicity rule: California, Colorado, Connecti-
cut, District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, Nevada, New
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont,
Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Kansas and Oregon have also adopted
the complicity rule. See supra note 7.
9. Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, and Washington. Briner v. Hyslop, 337
N.W.2d 858, 865 (Iowa 1983).
10. Alaska, New Hampshire, South Dakota, and Utah. Id.
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participation can be established by proof that the corporation
authorized or ratified the employee's act, the corporation reck-
lessly retained or employed the employee, or the act was com-
mitted by a managerial employee. The rationale for requiring
corporate participation is simple: "Unless the employer is him-
self guilty... an award punishing the employer... makes no
sense at all."" As the United States Supreme Court stated in
Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway v. Prentice:
Exemplary or punitive damages, being awarded, not by way of
compensation to the sufferer, but by way of punishment of the
offender, and as a warning to others, can only be awarded
against one who has participated in the offence. A principal,
therefore, though of course liable to make compensation for in-
juries done by his agent within the scope of his employment,
cannot be held liable for exemplary or punitive damages,
merely by reason of wanton, oppressive or malicious intent on
the part of the agent.12
Complicity proponents further point out that blameless
shareholders bear the financial burden if a corporation is held
vicariously liable for punitive damages.' 3 Investors are innocent
of any personal misconduct and are also "incapable of wielding
any effective restraints over actions by corporate employees.' 4
The rationale behind the corporate participation require-
ment is without merit. Under basic principles of respondeat su-
perior corporate participation is irrelevant to vicarious liability.
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, corporations are lia-
ble for injuries proximately resulting from the acts of employees
11. Williams v. City of New York, 508 F.2d 356, 360 (2d Cir. 1974); see also Tolle v.
Interstate Sys. Truck Lines, Inc., 42 Ill. App. 3d 771, 773, 356 N.E.2d 625, 626 (1976)
("[A]n assessment of punitive damages is more difficult to justify where an otherwise
innocent principal is held liable solely on the basis of respondeat superior."); Goddard v.
Grand Trunk Ry., 57 Me. 202, 247 (1869) (Tapley, J., dissenting) ("The idea of punish-
ing one who is not particeps criminis in the wrong done is so entirely devoid of the first
principles and fundamental elements of law, that it can never find place among the rules
of action in an intelligent and virtuous community."); RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS
§ 909 comment b (1979) ("The [complicity] rule ... results from the reasons for award-
ing punitive damages, which make it improper ordinarily to award punitive damages
against one who himself is personally innocent and therefore liable only vicariously.").
12. 147 U.S. 101, 107 (1893).
13. See PROSSER, supra note 5, at 12; Morris, Punitive Damages in Personal Injury
Cases, 21 OHIo ST. L.J. 216, 218 (1960).
14. Courtney & Cavico, Jr., Punitive Damages: When Are They Justifiable?, 18
TRAL, Aug. 1982, at 52, 54.
317]
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committed within the scope of their employment. 15 Whether the
doctrine is founded on public policy, convenience, or justice, an
employee's acts should be imputed to the corporation because
[a] corporation is an imaginary being. It has no mind but the
mind of its servants; it has no voice but the voice of its ser-
vants; and it has no hands with which to act but the hands of
its servants. All its schemes of mischief, as well as its schemes
of public enterprise, are conceived by human minds and exe-
cuted by human hands; and these minds and hands are its ser-
vants' minds and hands.'
The corporate participation requirement suggests that im-
posing corporate vicarious liability for punitive damages hinges
on the level of corporate involvement in the tortious act. How-
ever, the doctrine of respondeat superior has never based vicari-
ous liability on the level of the corporation's participation. The
focus is on the employee's act, not on the level of corporate in-
volvement. The corporation is liable if the employee's tortious
act was "committed in the course and scope of the agent's em-
ployment even though [the corporation] does not authorize, rat-
ify, participate in, or know of, such misconduct.' 17 Because the
degree of corporate involvement is immaterial under the doc-
trine of respondeat superior, arguments regarding when punish-
ment is appropriate miss the point: punitive damages are
awarded against the corporation because the employee's acts are
the corporation's acts.
The complicity rule's weaknesses are further illuminated by
examining each of its three standards for determining corporate
involvement. The first requirement, that the corporation author-
ize or ratify the conduct, is often meaningless. Rarely, if ever,
would a corporation authorize its employees to beat, insult, or
outrage third parties; nor would a corporation ratify or partici-
pate in such conduct.18 "Indeed, it would be a startling event if
any [corporation] sanctioned the intentional tort of its agent
15. See 57 C.J.S. Master and Servant § 570 (1955).
16. Goddard v. Grand Trunk Ry., 57 Me. 202, 223 (1869).
17. 3 Ah. Ju. 2D Agency § 267 (1962).
18. See Pullman Palace-Car Co. v. Lawrence, 74 Miss. 782, 803, 22 So. 53, 58 (1897)
("Corporations never expressly authorize their servants to beat or insult or outrage those
having business relations with them, and they rarely ratify such conduct."); West v. F.W.
Woolworth Co., 215 N.C. 211, 215, 1 S.E.2d 546, 549 (1939) ("Employers seldom, if ever,
instruct or directly authorize their employees to wrongfully invade the personal or prop-
erty rights of others.").
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when the result would be to expose itself to liability for punitive
damages." '
Similarly, the requirement of corporate authorization evalu-
ates the tortious act out of context. The pivotal issue in deter-
mining corporate liability for an employee's tortious act is not
whether the tortious act itself was within the ordinary course of
business, but whether the tortious act was committed by an em-
ployee while engaged in the ordinary course of employment. 0
The complicity rule's third requirement, that the tortious
act be committed by a managerial employee, is also problematic.
This requirement suggests that corporate liability hinges on em-
ployment status. A managerial employee's acts will initiate lia-
bility but a menial employee's acts will not. However, while the
scope of duties varies among employees, each employee has du-
ties entrusted to him by the corporation. A menial employee is
as fully authorized to act for the corporation in performing his
entrusted duties as is a managerial employee.21 Agency alone
19. Hale v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 42 Cal. App. 3d 681, 703, 117 Cal. Rptr. 146, 161
(1974) (Kerrigan, J., concurring and dissenting); see also Pullman Palace-Car Co. v. Law-
rence, 74 Miss. 782, 803, 22 So. 53, 58 (1897) ("If corporations . . . can never be held
liable in punitive damages for the acts of their servants unless expressly authorized...
or ... ratified by them ... we feel perfectly safe in declaring that no recovery for more
than mere compensatory damages will ever again be awarded against corporations.");
Note, Exemplary Damages Against Corporations, 30 GEO. L.J. 294, 300-01 (1942)
("Since a corporation will rarely authorize the commission of a tort and ordinarily will
not ratify one, the protection and safety of the public from tortious acts of omnipresent
corporate employees should not depend on these improbable contingencies.").
20. See Wilkinson v. Gray, 523 F. Supp. 372 (E.D. Va. 1981), aff'd sub nom. Wilkin-
son v. United States, 677 F.2d 998 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 906 (1982); Scott v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 27 Ariz. App. 236, 553 P.2d 1221 (1976); United Bhd. Of Carpenters v.
Humphreys, 203 Va. 781, 127 S.E.2d 98 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 954 (1963).
21. See Mobile & O.R.R. v. Seals, 100 Ala. 368, 375, 13 So. 917, 919 (1893):
The president of a railway corporation is no more or less its agent than a
brakeman on one of its trains. His agency is broader, but it is not boundless,
and a matter which lies beyond its limits is as thoroughly beyond his powers as
any matter beyond the very much smaller circle of a brakeman's duties; ... a
brakeman is as fully authorized to act for the company, within the range of his
employment, as the president is within the limits of his office. It can no more
be said that the corporation has impliedly authorized or sanctioned the willful
wrong of its president, in the accomplishment of some end within his author-
ity, than that a similar wrong by a brakeman, to an authorized end, is the
wrong of the corporate entity.
See also Stroud v. Denny's Restaurant, Inc., 271 Or. 430, 437, 532 P.2d 790, 793 (1975)
("If the employee was acting within the scope of his employment, the corporation will be
liable for punitive damages regardless of whether that employee may be classified as
'menial.' ").
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cannot justify the fluctuation of liability between employee
classes.
Complicity proponents distinguish managerial and menial
employees on two grounds. First, they argue that the nature of
the act fluctuates with employee status. However, injuries result-
ing from acts of managerial employees are no different from in-
juries resulting from the same acts of any other employee. 22 "No
matter who the actor may be, it does not alter the character of
the act itself. '23 Second, the complicity proponents argue that
managerial acts reflect corporate intent. However, the doctrine
of respondeat superior merely requires that the tortious act be
committed in the employee's scope of employment. Corporate
intent is not relevant.24
Under respondeat superior, no justification exists for the
complicity rule's requirements of corporate authorization or rati-
fication, reckless retention or employment practices, or an act
committed by a managerial employee. Stripped of these addi-
tional requirements, the complicity rule mirrors the course of
employment rule and can be rejected in its entirety.
III. WEAKNESSES OF THE CoURSE OF EMPLOYMENT RULE
Proponents of the course of employment rule "have been
concerned primarily with the deterrent effect of the award of
[punitive] damages, and have said that if such damages will en-
courage employers to exercise closer control over their servants
for the prevention of outrageous torts, that is sufficient ground
for awarding them" even in the absence of corporate approval,
ratification, or involvement.25 A corporation facing the threat of
punitive damages will exercise greater care over its employees
and recurrence of similar tortious conduct will thereby be
avoided.
22. Campen v. Stone, 635 P.2d 1121, 1134 (Wyo. 1981) (Rose, C.J., dissenting).
23. Id.
24. Note also that requiring an employee to be a managerial agent undercuts the
deterrence goal. Corporate employers may assume that "liability for punitive damages
will only be assessed when an unfortunate plaintiff is 'lucky' enough to be injured by the
wanton misconduct of an employee in its management hierarchy." Id. Such an assump-
tion "provides no incentive for corporations to control the acts of their lower-level em-
ployees." Id. In fact, "if prevention be the purpose of exemplary damages against corpo-
rations, the threat and hence the prevention would seem to be lessened substantially by
a rule which imposes upon the plaintiff the difficult task of showing wrongdoing by those
'higher up."' C. McCORMIcK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 80, at 285 (1935).
25. PROSSER, supra note 5, at 13.
HeinOnline  -- 1985 BYU L. Rev. 322 1985
CORPORATE VICARIOUS LIABILITY
This theory is problematic for several reasons. First, it as-
sumes that a corporation will always expend the funds necessary
to prevent the act from recurring. However, a corporation "will
ordinarily spend on prevention only that amount which when
added to the remaining risk cost will produce a lower total cost
than any other combination of prevention and risk costs. '2 6 Sim-
ply stated, a corporation may find paying punitive damages
cheaper than implementing costly risk-reducing controls.
Second, the course of employment rule assumes that if
funds necessary to exercise stricter control over employees are
expended, future occurrence of similar tortious conduct will be
deterred. Complicity proponents correctly point out, however,
that "there can be no effective deterrence unless there is some
conduct which can be deterred. '27 They note that "[t]he ability
to better control the actions of the employee through greater su-
pervision is often illusory. . . . [E]mployees may perform their
duties where direct supervision is impossible. Further, increased
supervision may well be ineffective to prevent the occurrence of
certain torts ....
Strictly applying the course of employment rule may impose
vicarious liability for punitive damages despite corporate inabil-
ity to avert future tortious conduct. Awarding punitive damages
in such situations cannot be justified, for in the absence of any
deterrence the award fails to fulfill any substantial societal in-
26. Comment, The Assessment of Punitive Damages Against an Entrepreneur for
the Malicious Torts of His Employees, 70 YALE L.J. 1296, 1302 (1961). For example, if
no money were expended on preventive measures and a 90% probability existed that
$500 in punitive damages would be awarded, the resultant risk cost would be $450 (90%
x $500) and the total cost would be $450. If $50 were expended to reduce the probability
of assessment to 60%, the resultant risk cost would be $300 and the total cost would be
$350. If $200 were expended to reduce the probability to 40%, then the resultant risk
cost would be $200 and the total cost would be $400. Because the lowest total cost ($350)
to the corporation exists when it spends only $50, it will probably spend no more. How-
ever, the control actually necessary to prevent future similar conduct might cost $250.
The course of employment rule assumes that the corporation will expend the necessary
$250 when faced with the threat of punitive damages. However, the prudent corporation
will not spend the necessary $250 because its total cost will not be lowest if more than
$50 is spent on prevention. Accordingly, the corporation will not spend the funds neces-
sary to exercise greater control if doing so is not economically feasible. See id. at 1302
n.40.
27. Briner v. Hyslop, 337 N.W.2d 858, 865 (Iowa 1983).
28. Tolle v. Interstate Sys. Truck Lines, Inc., 42 Ill. App. 3d 771, 773, 356 N.E.2d
625, 627 (1976); see also Briner v. Hyslop, 337 N.W.2d 858, 865-66 (Iowa 1983); Kline v.
Multi-Media Cablevision, Inc., 233 Kan. 988, 992, 666 P.2d 711, 715 (1983).
317]
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terest. Therefore, the course of employment rule in its present
state should be rejected.
IV. PROPOSAL OF A NEW RULE
For a rule imposing corporate vicarious liability for punitive
damages to be acceptable, the following two inquiries must be
answered affirmatively: (1) Does the rule focus solely on whether
a tortious act was committed within the scope of employment?
and (2) Would awarding punitive damages deter future tortious
conduct of a similar nature?
Because liability is imposed under the doctrine of respon-
deat superior, any new rule of law must focus on whether the
tortious act was committed within the scope of an agent's em-
ployment. The rule need not concern itself with the level of cor-
porate participation in the act, nor address any intent on the
part of the corporation. The first inquiry is answered affirma-
tively if the course of employment rule is adopted because it re-
quires only that the tortious act be committed within the scope
of the agent's employment.
The purpose of awarding punitive damages under the doc-
trine of respondeat superior is to deter future tortious conduct
of a similar nature. Punitive damages are awarded under the
course of employment rule in its present state, however, even in
situations when future tortious conduct cannot be deterred. The
course of employment rule, therefore, must be modified to sat-
isfy the second inquiry.
The following proposed rule reflects such a modification: A
corporation is vicariously liable for punitive damages if an em-
ployee commits a tortious act while engaged in his scope of em-
ployment and imposing vicarious liability for punitive damages
may deter future tortious conduct of a similar nature. This new
rule requires affirmative answers to the two necessary inquiries
in determining whether imposing corporate vicarious liability for
punitive damages is justified.
The impact of the proposed rule is illustrated by applying it
to an existing case. In Campen v. Stone,29 Edward Campen was
driving from Billings, Montana, to Casper, Wyoming, to give a
speech on behalf of his employer, Schlumberger Well Services.
On the morning of his travels, he took a prescribed valium tablet
and an Allerest tablet. At lunch he consumed three martinis. In
29. 635 P.2d 1121 (Wyo. 1981).
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the late afternoon he collided with the rear end of Stone's
pickup on Interstate 90. Campen refused to submit to a blood
alcohol test but later pled guilty to driving too fast for condi-
tions.30 The Wyoming Supreme Court adopted "the [complicity]
test as set forth in the Restatement as the one to be used in
determining when an employer may be held liable for punitive
damages as a result of the misconduct of the employee."31 After
reviewing the record, the Wyoming Supreme Court concluded
that it could not "find that sufficient evidence supporting such a
judgment for punitive damages against Schlumberger existed as
a matter of law." 2
The Campen result may have been different had the Wyo-
ming Supreme Court applied the proposed rule. Under the pro-
posed rule, the Wyoming Supreme Court would first have asked
whether Campen was acting within the scope of his employment
when the collision occurred. The court answered this question
affirmatively: "In the present case Schlumberger, as the em-
ployer, conceded that at the time of the accident Campen, its
employee, was acting within the scope of his employment." 3
The court's second inquiry would have been whether impos-
ing vicarious liability for punitive damages would deter future
conduct of a similar nature. An examination of the facts indi-
cates that such conduct could be deterred in the future. The risk
of collision increases as Schlumberger's employees travel. Impos-
ing vicarious liability for punitive damages may prompt Schlum-
berger not only to inquire about its employees' physical health
prior to traveling, but also to forbid its employees from consum-
ing alcohol when traveling. Schlumberger's actions would be rel-
atively inexpensive and would probably help prevent future col-
lisions. Imposing vicarious liability for punitive damages would
therefore be justified. 4
30. Id. at 1122.
31. Id. at 1125.
32. Id. at 1126.
33. Id. at 1123-24.
34. Applying the proposed rule will not always provide results contrary to those ob-
tained when the complicity rule or the scope of employment rule is employed. The pro-
posed rule and the complicity rule provide different results only when evidence indicates
no employer authorization, ratification, or participation, no managerial tortfeasor, and no
reckless hiring or retention practices, but does indicate imposing vicarious liability for
punitive damages will deter future tortious conduct of a similar nature (or vice versa).
The proposed rule and the scope of employment rule provide different results only when
evidence indicates vicarious liability for punitive damages will not deter future tortious
conduct of a similar nature.
317]
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V. CONCLUSION
Modifying the course of employment rule results in a new
rule that addresses the only inquiry demanded by the doctrine
of respondeat superior-whether the act occurred within the
scope of employment. The new rule also limits vicarious liability
to situations in which the deterrent justification for awarding
punitive damages is fulfilled. The court must still determine
whether the agent was acting within the scope of his employ-
ment when the tortious conduct was committed and whether im-
posing corporate vicarious liability for punitive damages will de-
ter future tortious conduct. Although both issues may raise
application problems, the new rule at least provides the courts
with a proper starting point when deciding whether to impose
corporate vicarious liability for punitive damages awarded for an
employee's tortious act.
Timothy R. Zinnecker
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